Let us not pass over the concept of "passive terrorism" itself. What is that?
An old US State Department definition held that terrorism was the use of violence for political means. Usage suggests that there have been other, unspoken modifiers involved. So, for instance, government use of violence is not usually called terrorism because governments are regarded as lawful coercers. Conversely, to call an action to task as "state terrorism" might suggest illegitimacy on the part of the state or of states in general.
Now, it seems to be a commonplace of Western discourse that violence is legitimate if it is against terrorists, sort of like it used to be legitimate if it were against communists or Jews. To whatever extent that sort of rhetoric is allowed to stand, any expansion in the notion of "terrorist" means an increase in the range of people towards whom violence is considered legitimate.
Now, what do we understand from this term "passive terrorism"? The terrorist is a terrorist, of course. But this terrorist is passive: this terrorist does not wield the violence, only fail to prevent it. Of course, if any act of terrorism actually occurs, whatever we might hold that to mean, everyone fails to prevent it. By this trick the presumed legitimacy of violence is extended ad infinitum.
In practice, such accusations are only useful if a distinction can be made, but that is simply a matter of determining any prejudicial category, with no necessary relationship to any sort of causality. So, if I decide that "Muslims should stop terrorism," then that may be asserted, however absurdly, without any real check for a relationship between "Muslim" and "terrorist."
In this particular case, of course, the US wishes to legitimize the violence that it uses against women and children as well as against men.